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The Risk of Financial Irresponsibility
Under New York C.P.L.R. 1602(6)
A CALL FOR REFORM'
I. INTRODUCTION
New York State automobile insurance rates have
increased dramatically in recent years.' In 2001, New York's
average automobile insurance premiums were the second
highest in the nation and trailed New Jersey, the most
expensive state, by only 1.8 percent. Overall in 2001,
automobile insurance rates increased by 8.1 percent, and more
importantly, rates for compulsory automobile liability
insurance increased by a staggering 17.2 percent.3 Despite
© 2004 Joseph D. Zavaglia. All Rights Reserved.
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO THE NEW
YORK LEGISLATURE, CALENDAR YEAR 2001, at 73 (2001) [hereinafter NY ANNUAL
INSURANCE REPORT].
2 See Bankrate.com, Best and Worst States for Auto Insurance Premiums, at
http://aoll.bankrate.com/AOL/news/auto/20030910bl.asp?header=pf (last visited Mar.
1, 2004).
In 1994, New York State had the fifth highest annual automobile
insurance premiums in the nation. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 204 (Denise Clinton ed., 1998). Average annual
premiums in 1994 for New Yorkers were $1,029.09, only approximately 7% lower than
New Jersey, the most expensive state in the United States. Id. By 1998, New York
State automobile insurance rates had risen to become the second highest in the nation.
New York Insurance Rates Among Costliest, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B5. Within
New York State, rates in Brooklyn were the highest, averaging $3,304.00 per year. Id.
3 NY ANNUAL INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 73. The percentage
increase in insurance rates occurred in insurance companies that represented 77% of
the entire New York automobile insurance market. Id. The 2001 rate increases are
quite remarkable when compared to the modest 1.6% increase in the consumer price
index. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price
Index - All Urban Consumers, at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/cpinr.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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those increases, rates rose by 8.4 percent in 2002 and are
expected to rise an additional nine percent in 2003.' One factor
driving up automobile liability insurance rates is increased
jury awards in automobile accident cases Higher jury awards
result in larger claim payments, which naturally lead to higher
insurance premiums.'
In order to limit claim payments, and thereby decrease
automobile liability insurance rates, this Note suggests
abolishing joint and several liability in automobile accident
cases.' In New York, section 1601 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules (C.P.L.R.) partially abolishes the ancient joint and
several liability doctrine However, C.P.L.R. section 1602(6)
specifically excepts automobile accident cases from section
1601's partial abolition. This Note argues that C.P.L.R. section
1602(6) should be repealed because it is both unnecessary and
unjustified.'°
When liability is joint and several, the plaintiff has the
freedom to seek recovery against all of the tortfeasors, against
only one, or against a few select members of a group.11 Thus,
under joint and several liability, a defendant who is only partly
responsible for the plaintiffs injuries may be held fully liable."
4 See Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics: The Rising Cost
of Auto Insurance, at http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto (last visited Mar.
1, 2004).
, See id. Other factors contributing to increases in automobile insurance
premiums include an upward trend in medical care costs, automobile repair costs,
fraud, and theft of air bags. See id. From 1994 to 2000, the average jury award in
automobile liability cases rose 44% from $187,000 to $269,000. See Dr. Robert P.
Hartwig, What's Behind the Rising Cost of Auto and Homeowners Insurance?, at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/hot/20022003outlook/ (last visited June 24, 2003).
6 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 103, 527.
7 See Jonathan Cardi, Apportioning Responsibility To Immune Nonparties:
An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 82 IOwA L. REv. 1293, 1302 (1997) (recognizing that large companies
and local governments cited joint and several liability as a cause for skyrocketing
insurance premiums). "Critics of the doctrine have also pointed out that joint and
several liability may hinder insurers' ability to predict risks and set aside narrow risk
pools for specialized insurance plans. These interferences with risk assessment and
customized plans likely drive up insurance premiums." Id.
' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2003).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(6) (McKinney 2003).
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 116-48 (unnecessary) and 92-115
(unjustified).
" See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (6th ed. 1994).
12 As a result, joint and several liability "often has the effect of turning a
lawsuit into a search for a peripherally involved party whose pockets are deep enough
to pay a sizable award." New Yorkers for Civil Justice Reform, Reform Priorities, at
http://www.nycjr.org/reforms.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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Preserving joint and several liability in automobile accident
cases increases the potential liability of all motorists involved
in accidents, which in turn increases the claim payments of
liability insurance companies. The increased claim payments
are ultimately passed on to all responsible motorists in the
form of higher liability insurance premiums.'3
This Note asserts two reasons why section 1602(6)'s
automobile exception should be repealed. First, the current
New York statutory scheme unjustifiably shifts the risk of an
insolvent co-defendant from the plaintiff to the financially
responsible defendant. Second, section 1602(6)'s protections are
redundant and thus unnecessary. Irrespective of section
1602(6), plaintiffs who fall within the class of persons defined
as an "insured" in the Personal Auto Policy" (PAP-insured
plaintiffs) are protected from financially irresponsible
defendants"5 because New York law requires all motorists to
purchase uninsured motorist coverage. 6 Additionally, plaintiffs
who are not considered PAP-insured (non-PAP-insured
plaintiffs) are also protected from financially irresponsible
defendants, again irrespective of section 1602(6), by the Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation.'7
This rest of this Note proceeds in three parts. Part II
illustrates the practical effects of the current New York
statutory scheme establishing joint and several liability,
contribution, and comparative fault in automobile accident
cases.'" It then demonstrates how joint and several liability, in
conjunction with a claim for contribution, shifts the risk of a
financially irresponsible defendant from the plaintiff to a
financially responsible defendant.
Part III explains the impact of automobile insurance on
the tort process by focusing on the Personal Auto Policy (PAP)
and its four major coverages: liability coverage, medical
13 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
591 (5th ed. 1984).
1 The PAP is a widely-used standard personal automobile insurance policy.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
'5 A "financially irresponsible defendant" is a term of art. As used herein, a
financially irresponsible defendant shall be defined as a motorist who has not
purchased automobile liability insurance and who is also financially unable to satisfy
an injured person's damage award. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAW 413-14 (West Group 1988).
16 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-321 (McKinney 2003).
' See infra text accompanying notes 132-48.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 21-50.
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payments coverage, uninsured motorist coverage, and coverage
for damage to the insured automobile.'9 This Part then
illustrates how joint and several liability and contribution
claims are processed once there is applicable automobile
insurance.
Part IV posits the reasons for repealing section 1602(6).20
Part IV.A examines the policy concerns normally present when
the law shifts the risk of an insolvent co-defendant from the
plaintiff to another defendant, and then demonstrates how
those policy concerns are lacking in the automobile accident
context. Part IV.B demonstrates that plaintiffs do not need
section 1602(6)'s protections because both compulsory
uninsured motorist coverage as well as the Motor Vehicle
Accident Corporation adequately protect them from financially
irresponsible defendants. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that
joint and several liability unjustifiably and unnecessarily
drives up the cost of automobile liability insurance in New
York.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, CONTRIBUTION, AND
COMPARATIVE FAULT IN NEW YORK
The common law doctrine of joint and several liability
gives a plaintiff the ability to choose from whom among several
tortfeasors to pursue for the full amount of her damages.' A
plaintiff can elect to pursue a full recovery against one, some,
or all of the at-fault parties.2 Under New York law,23 joint and
several liability applies when two or more people either act in
'9 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 171.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 78-148.
21 Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, POCKET EDITION 377 (5th ed. 2000) (defining joint and
several liability as liability that may be apportioned at the plaintiffs discretion either
among two or more parties, or to only one or a few select members of the group).
22 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS 358 (10th ed. 2000). See generally
William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937).
Joint and several liability originated in the English report of Sir John
Heydon's Case, resting on the theory of concerted action. 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B.
1613); see also Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment
as it Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565 (2000). The rationale for
joint and several liability "grew out of the common law concept of the unity of the cause
of action; the jury could not be permitted to apportion the damages since there was but
one wrong." Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 584 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982).
23 See LEE S. KREINDLER ET AL., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS (WEST'S NEW YORK
PRACTICE SERIES) § 10.2 (2002).
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concert to commit an injury, 4 breach a common duty owed to
the plaintiff," or commit separate individual acts that cause an
indivisible injury to the plaintiff." For example, in an
automobile accident case, joint and several liability attaches
when two motorists negligently strike each other and injure a
third party. In such a case, the injured third party can recover
all of her damages from any one or all of the potentially liable
motorists.
Joint and several liability can lead to inequitable results
by holding a partly responsible defendant fully liable for the
plaintiffs injuries. To ameliorate the harshness of joint and
several liability, many jurisdictions, including New York, allow
a joint tortfeasor who has paid more than his apportioned
share of damages to seek recovery from the other tortfeasors by
asserting a claim for contribution."
In 1972, the New York Court of Appeals first recognized
a claim for contribution in the seminal case of Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co. ,' holding that:
where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but
not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages,
the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant
24 See, e.g., De Carvalho v. Brunner, 223 N.Y. 284, 119 N.E. 563 (1918)
(holding that when two or more people are negligently racing horses on a street and
one injures a pedestrian, they are both joint and severally liable); see also Bierczynski
v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968) (finding that all parties engaging in a motor
vehicle race on a street are wrongdoers acting in concert).
25 See, e.g., Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 365, 14 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1938)
(holding that a common duty was breached when a flower pot fell from a common party
wall between two buildings and injured plaintiff); see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note
22, at 359 (citing Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding Kmart fully liable to customer injured because manufacturer of a sled failed to
properly warn of its risks)).
26 See, e.g., Hawkes v. Goll, 281 N.Y. 808, 24 N.E.2d 484 (1939) (finding
indivisible injury from two separate acts when pedestrian on a highway was struck by
an automobile and thrown to the other side of the road, where he was then struck by
another automobile); see also Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 207 (holding that the doctrine of
comparative fault, in lieu of contributory negligence, does not eliminate joint and
several liability).
27 See Paul F. Kirgis, Apportioning Tort Damage in New York: A Method to
the Madness, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 427 (2001).
28 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972). In Dole, the plaintiffs husband died
by inhaling methyl bromide, a fumigant, used by his employer and manufactured by
Dow. Plaintiff sued Dow, alleging it failed to adequately warn users of the fumigant's
dangers. Id. at 146. Dow impleaded the decedent's employer for indemnification,
alleging that the decedent's death, if caused by negligence, was caused by the "active
and primary negligence" of the employer while Dow's negligence was "merely passive
and secondary." Id. The Court abandoned the active-passive indemnification concept
and recognized a claim for contribution. Id. at 148.
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against the third party... [by] an apportionment of responsibility in
negligence between those parties.'
In 1974, the legislature codified Dole in section 1401 of
the C.P.L.R. ° Thus, although a defendant who is jointly and
severally liable will still be responsible in full to the plaintiff,
that defendant may seek reimbursement by asserting a claim
for contribution against the other at-fault parties. Accordingly,
in theory, a defendant's net liability should never exceed his
apportioned percentage of fault.'
Although contribution claims seem to link each party's
ultimate liability to his or her apportioned percentage of fault,
"[tihe right to contribution . .. is cold comfort when the other
culpable persons are insolvent . . . ., Therefore, contribution
only partially addresses the harshness and inequity of joint
and several liability. Although it provides a means for
equitable reimbursement, the initial defendant must still bear
the risk that the other tortfeasors are identifiable, subject to
the jurisdiction of the court,33 and solvent.' Additionally, even if
the other defendants meet those criteria, the first defendant
initially held liable may incur opportunity costs as he waits for
his contribution claims to bear fruit.
Joint defendants were not the only parties suffering
under the harsh pre-Dole tort laws. 5 Plaintiffs also faced the
inequitable contributory negligence defense. The defense
completely barred recovery if the plaintiff was at all
responsible for their injury.6 Thus, a plaintiff found to be even
29 Id. at 148-49.
30 Section 1401 provides in pertinent part that, "two or more persons who are
subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or
wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person from whom contribution
is sought." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1401 (McKinney 2003). Section 1401 also provides that
contribution is to be determined based on equitable shares of fault. See also Kirgis,
supra note 27, at 430.
31 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1401 (McKinney 2003).
32 Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601,
C1601:1 (McKinney 1997 Main Volume).
'3 Obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in automobile
accident cases is not problematic because section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
appoints the secretary of state as an agent for service of process for such defendants.
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 253(a) (McKinney 2003).
34 See generally SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 364.
35 See Kirgis, supra note 27, at 431-32.
36 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1033 (defining contributory
negligence). Three main factors led to the development of contributory negligence: first
and foremost the courts distrusted the pro-plaintiff juries in the early nineteenth
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one percent at fault would be denied any recovery. Despite the
harshness of the doctrine, the New York Court of Appeals in
Codling v. Paglia37 refused to adopt the more equitable
comparative negligence standard, which, instead of completely
denying an at-fault plaintiff any recovery, would reduce the
award by the percentage of the plaintiffs fault.3
However, in 1975 the legislature responded by enacting
a pure comparative fault standard in C.P.L.R. section 1411. 31
Under the new standard, "a plaintiffs contributory negligence
does not operate to bar his recovery altogether, but does serve
to reduce his damages in proportion to his fault. 4 ' For example,
if a plaintiff proves one hundred thousand dollars in damages,
but is found to be twenty percent at fault, the plaintiffs
recovery will be decreased to eighty thousand dollars.'
Adopting comparative negligence and contribution links the
parties' ultimate liability to their apportioned fault and thereby
increases the "fairness" of the tort process.
Nonetheless, those reforms did not perfect the scheme.
In 1986, the state legislature recognized additional schematic
shortcomings and partially abolished joint and several
century; the courts sought to limit the liabilities of the growing industry; and the
courts were also unable to apportion damages in cases in which both plaintiff and
defendant were at fault. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 452.
37 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630 (1973) (holding that the
legislature, and not the courts, should address the harshness of contributory
negligence).
See Kirgis, supra note 27, at 430.
Id. at 432. Section 1411 provides in pertinent part:
[i]n any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the
decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not
bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the
damages.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2003); see also Vincent C. Alexander, Practice
Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411, C1411:1 (McKinney 1997 Main Volume).
40 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 471-72. "The move from contributory
negligence to comparative fault in tort law has been swift and pervasive, with only four
states and the District of Columbia retaining pure contributory negligence schemes."
Cardi, supra note 7, at 1294.
41 Under a pure comparative fault analysis a plaintiffs recovery can be
calculated by applying the formula: Recovery = Damages x (1 - % of plaintiffs
attributed fault). See Alternative Rules for Determining Tort Liability: Comparative
Negligence, COKE'S INSTITUTES OF THE LAW (No. 2) (Amanda J. Owens & Charles K
Rowley eds.), available at http://www.thelockeinstitute.org/journals/tortliability9.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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liability. 2 Under section 1601, " the legislature retained joint
and several liability with respect to economic loss, but not with
respect to non-economic loss when a defendant's fault is fifty
percent or less." Accordingly, a tortfeasor apportioned less than
fifty percent of the fault will not pay in excess of his culpability
for the plaintiff's non-economic loss. 5 Thus, section 1601 shifts
the risk of a co-defendant's insolvency, at least in some
circumstances, from a financially responsible defendant back to
the plaintiff."
Despite the legislature's recognition of the inequities of
joint and several liability, it nonetheless exempted certain
actions from section 1601's limitations." Most notably, section
1602(6) states that section 1601 does "not apply to any person
42 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2003). New York's limitations on joint
and several liability were consistent with trends elsewhere. By 1997, "only fourteen
states and the District of Columbia retain[ed virtually pure joint and several liability.
Of the remaining thirty-six states, sixteen states have abolished, or nearly abolished,
joint and several liability, and twenty [states] have adopted a hybrid of the two
systems." Cardi, supra note 7, at 1302-04.
43 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 provides in pertinent part:
when a verdict or decision in an action or claim for personal injury is
determined in favor of a claimant in an action involving two or more
tortfeasors jointly liable.., and the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty
percent or less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability
of such defendant to the claimant for non-economic loss shall not exceed that
defendant's equitable share determined in accordance with the relative
culpability of each person causing or contributing to the total liability for non-
economic loss.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2003).
44 Economic losses are out-of-pocket expenses which include, but are not
limited to, medical expenses and lost earnings. Non-economic losses are defined in N.Y.
C.P.L.R. section 1600 as including, but not limited to, pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and loss of consortium. In addition to New York, other states that also limit
the application of joint and several liability depending on whether the damages are
economic or non-economic include Florida, Ohio, California, and Nebraska. See
Vandall, supra note 22, at 589 n.147.
45 See Kirgis, supra note 27, at 434. For example, assume the plaintiff suffers
$20,000 in economic damages, $80,000 in non-economic damages, and the jury finds
defendant A 70% at fault and defendant B 30% at fault. Without section 1601,
defendant B could be forced to pay the full $100,000 in damages. However, under
section 1601, the most defendant B could be required to pay would be $44,000, the full
economic damage plus 30% of the non-economic damages. See id.
'6 Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601,
C1601:1 (McKinney 1997 Main Volume).
" See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602 (McKinney 2003). Some of the exceptions include:
actions for intentional torts; cases where the defendant has acted with reckless
disregard for the safety of others; or cases involving administrative proceedings. See
generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(1)-(12) (McKinney 2003). There is a presumption that
section 1601 governs and a party wishing to rely upon a section 1602 exception must
carry the burden of proving its applicability. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1603 (McKinney 2003);
see also Tortfeasor Jointly, Severally Liable; Valet Parking is Deemed Use of Car,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1996, at 25.
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held liable by reason of his use, operation, or ownership of a
motor vehicle or motorcycle . *. .."I As a result, "the reduced-
liability benefits of [section 1601] are unavailable to most of the
tortfeasors in the most common tort case of all: the motor
vehicle accident."49  The combination of section 1602(6)'s
preservation of joint and several liability for automobile
accident claims and section 1401's recognition of a right to
contribution creates an inefficient' and complex risk transfer
mechanism. In theory, a defendant should never pay more than
his fair share because any excess payments made to the
plaintiff can be recovered by asserting a contribution claim.
However, in practice, there is always the risk that a co-
defendant will be insolvent. As a result, the scheme transfers
the risk of financial irresponsibility from the plaintiff to the
defendant. A defendant's risk decreases when section 1601
applies, but 1602(6)'s motor vehicle exception leaves many tort
defendants fully exposed to potentially large liabilities for
injuries for which they may be only partly responsible.
48 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(6) (McKinney 2003). Section 125 of the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law defines a motor vehicle as:
every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by
any power other than muscular power, except (a) electrically-driven mobility
assistance devices operated or driven by a person with a disability, (b)
vehicles which run only upon rails or tracks, (c) snowmobiles as defined in
article forty-seven of this chapter, and (d) all terrain vehicles as defined in
article forty-eight-B of this chapter. For the purposes of title four, the term
motor vehicle shall exclude fire and police vehicles other than ambulances.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 125 (McKinney 2003). Section 311 further provides:
the term "motor vehicle" shall be defined as in section one hundred twenty-
five of this chapter, except that it shall also include trailers, semi-trailers and
tractors other than tractors used exclusively for agricultural purposes, and
shall exclude fire and police vehicles, farm equipment, including self-
propelled machines used exclusively in growing, harvesting or handling farm
produce, tractors used exclusively for agricultural purposes, or for snow
plowing other than for hire, and self-propelled caterpillar or crawler-type
equipment while being operated on the contract site.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 311 (McKinney 2003).
Besides New York, Hawaii is the only other state that specifically retains
joint and several liability for automobile cases. See Carol A. Mutter, Moving to
Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L.
REV. 199, 318 (1990).
'9 Vincent C. Alexander, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602, Practice Commentaries,
subdivision 6 (McKinney 1997 Main Volume).
50 In the absence of joint and several liability, plaintiffs would join all
responsible parties, streamlining the litigation and obviating the need for contribution
claims. See Cardi, supra note 7, at 1302.
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III. THE IMPACT OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ON THE TORT
PROCESS
Each year there are approximately thirty-four million
motor vehicle accidents.' Assuming an equal distribution, an
accident occurs approximately every second of every day. The
economic costs are staggering. In 1994, automobile accidents
resulted in an estimated economic loss of almost $111 billion
dollars. 2 Since the potential liabilities can reach such enormous
levels, individuals often transfer the risk of loss to automobile
insurance companies by purchasing a Personal Auto Policy.'
Automobile liability insurance is part of almost all
actions involving automobile accidents because automobile
liability insurance is mandatory in forty-seven states and the
District of Columbia.' New York's compulsory insurance law
requires that motorists carry a minimum of twenty-five
thousand dollars in liability insurance for bodily injury to one
person, fifty thousand dollars for bodily injury to all persons,
and ten thousand dollars for property damage in any one
accident.' Motorists typically select higher limits because "the
51 BEN G. BALDWIN, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INSURANCE, PERSONAL
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR CLIENTS 111 (1999). In 2000,
41,821 people in the United States were killed in automobile accidents, 1,458 of whom
were killed within New York State. See Car-Accidents.com, Motor Vehicle Crash
Fatalities by State, at http://www.car-accidents.com/pages/stats/2000_by_state.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
52 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 169.
3 Id.
See Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Insurance Issues:
Compulsory Auto Insurance [hereinafter Compulsory Auto Insurance], at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/ insurance/compulsory/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
The only states that do not have compulsory automobile insurance liability
laws are New Hampshire, Tennessee and Wisconsin. Id. Connecticut was the first state
to enact a financial responsibility law. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15, at 413-14.
Under the Connecticut law, motorists involved in an accident causing damages in
excess of $100 were required to prove their ability to satisfy a claim up to $10,000. Id.
(citing Connecticut Public Acts Ch. 183 (1925)). The Connecticut approach was
ineffective because it required drivers to furnish proof of financial responsibility only
after they got into an accident. Id. at 601 (emphasis added). In 1956, New York adopted
a compulsory insurance law that required advance proof of financial responsibility by
all drivers. Id. (emphasis added); see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-321
(McKinney 2003). For a chart listing the compulsory automobile insurance
requirements of all states, see Compulsory Auto Insurance, supra.
See New York State Department of Insurance, Consumer Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.ins.state.ny.uslfaqcsl.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). Other
compulsory insurance coverages are no-fault coverage of $50,000 and uninsured
motorists coverage (for bodily injury) of $50,000. See id. Additionally, an insurer must
offer supplemental uninsured motorist limits of $250,000 per person per accident and
$500,000 per accident if a person has bodily injury liability limits of that amount or
higher. See id.
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losses which result from motor vehicle accidents are frequently
far in excess of the amount of liability insurance mandated by
the financial responsibility laws, even in those states with the
highest minimum levels for liability insurance."' Nevertheless,
the compulsory insurance requirements attempt to ensure that
injured plaintiffs receive, if not all, at least partial
indemnification for their damages from an at-fault party.
The most widely-used automobile insurance policy
throughout the United States is the Personal Auto Policy
(PAP)."7 The PAP is a standard policy, drafted by the Insurance
Services Office,"8 typically containing four main types of
protections: liability coverage; medical payments coverage;
uninsured motorist coverage; and coverage for damage to the
insured automobile." The liability coverage section is the most
noteworthy section because it protects the insured against
claims from third parties that arise out of the negligent
operation of the insured automobile.' The insurance company
agrees to "pay damages for bodily injury or property damage
for which any insured becomes legally responsible because of
an auto[mobile] accident." ' In addition, the insurer agrees to
"defend, as [it] considers appropriate, any claim or suit asking
for these damages . . . [and] pay all defense costs [it] incurs."2
Thus, if an insured maintains a PAP with adequate liability
limits, she can rest assured that the insurer will both defend
See KEETON & WIDISS supra, note 15, at 403, 602-03 (explaining that
minimum liability amounts are "grossly inadequate").
57 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 169. The PAP was first introduced in 1977 and
has undergone several revisions since then. Id. The discussion herein is based upon the
current 1994 edition of the PAP.
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) provides insurers, reinsurers and
insurance regulators actuarial, underwriting, and policy language support for a broad
spectrum of commercial and personal lines of insurance. See Insurance Services Office,
Inc., About ISO, available at http://www.iso.com/about-iso/index.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2004).
For a sample of the 1994 Personal Auto Policy, see REJDA, supra note 2,
app. B; see also INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS'
POLICY KIT 2-12 (1997).
60 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 171.
61 Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part A - Liability
Coverage, Insuring Agreement A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2, app. B.
6' Id. For a recent court of appeals case reviewing an insurers duty to defend,
see Town of Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.2d 435, 779
N.E.2d 167 (2002). An insurer's "duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify."
See id. at 443 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 64-65, 575
N.E.2d 90, 91-92 (1991)). "An insurer's duty to defend arises whenever the allegations
in a complaint state a cause of action that gives rise to a reasonable possibility of
recovery under the policy." Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 64-65.
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and, if necessary, pay for any covered claim arising from an
accident.63
The PAP's remaining three types of coverage are first-
party coverages that, unlike third party liability coverage, pay
the insured in the event of loss. The medical payments
coverage will pay all medical and funeral expenses incurred by
an insured up to the specified limit.' The uninsured motorist
coverage will pay the insured for bodily injury damages caused
by a hit-and-run driver or an uninsured motorist.' Last,
coverage for damage to your auto provides coverage for
physical damage or theft to the insured automobile.'
However, it is important to keep in mind that the
presence or absence of insurance does not affect the underlying
liabilities of the parties. 7 Insurance merely provides a means
for funding a judgment after the insured is found legally
liable.' In fact, evidence of insurance coverage is generally not
admissible to prove fault, and if a jury is told that a defendant
is insured a mistrial may result.' Therefore, the same legal
rules apply in determining liability regardless of whether the
defendant is insured. 6
Under a PAP, once an insurer has paid a claim on
behalf of the insured to an injured third party, the insured's
right to assert any contribution claims are "subrogated" to the
6 See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15, at 12. "Even in the absence
of a loss, however, the insured has still enjoyed the certainty that if the insured event
had occurred, insurance benefits would have been available as an offset." Id.
See REJDA, supra note 2, at 175.
65 See id. at 176.
66 See id. at 179.
67 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 593-94.
6 See id. at 594.
61 See Joanne B. Haelen, If the Jury Hears That a Defendant Is Covered by
Liability Insurance, A Mistrial is Not a Certainty, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J., Oct. 2002, at 35
(explaining that because "[tihe touchstone for a mistrial is prejudice," disclosing to the
jury that the defendant is protected by liability insurance may not necessarily result in
a mistrial) (quoting Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 490, 95 N.E. 10, 22
(1911) ("Evidence that the defendant ... was insured ... is so dangerous as to require
a reversal even when the court strikes it from the record and directs the jury to
disregard it.")). See also FED. R. EVID. 411 (2003) ("Evidence that a person was or was
not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully.").
70 There have been a few isolated cases where the presence of insurance was
a factor in deciding the merits of a case. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at
594. This was especially true in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co., 35 N.Y. 210
(1866), where the presence of fire insurance among urban property owners supported a
narrow interpretation of proximate cause in cases where fire spread to adjacent
properties.
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insurer.7' Subrogation transfers the insured's right to receive
contribution from the other joint tortfeasors to the insurer."
Specifically, the PAP provides that "[ilf we make a payment
under this policy and the person to or for whom payment was
made has a right to recover damages from another[,] we shall
be subrogated to that right."3 Therefore, "[an insurer asserting
a subrogation right is usually viewed as 'standing in the shoes'
of the insured so that the insurer's rights are equal to, but no
greater than, those of the insured.""
For example, assume an insured vehicle and another
vehicle negligently collide into each other and injure a
pedestrian. Both drivers would be jointly and severally liable to
the pedestrian because both drivers committed separate
individual negligent acts that caused an indivisible injury to
the plaintiff." If the pedestrian decides to file suit against only
the insured vehicle, the insurer would be liable, in full, for the
plaintiffs damages. However, the insurer can now assert a
contribution claim against the other driver because the
insured's right to receive contribution is subrogated to the
insurer." Insurers, like any other defendant, still bear the risk
that a joint tortfeasor will be unidentifiable or insolvent, but on
the whole, subrogation allows insurers to somewhat limit their
ultimate liability to the apportioned fault of their underlying
policyholders. As a result, aggregate claim payments diminish,
which in turn lowers liability insurance premiums.7"
71 See generally Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part F -
General Provisions, Our Right to Recover Payment, para. A, reprinted in REJDA, supra,
note 2, app. B. However, there is no right of subrogation for an insurer against either a
named insured or any other party covered as an additional insured. KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 15, at 221; see also S.S.D.W. Co. v. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 76 N.Y.2d 228,
235, 556 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (1990) (recognizing that the insurer has no right to
subrogation against its own insured). For subrogation generally, see KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 15, § 3.10(a).
72 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15, at 219.
73 Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part F - General
Provisions, Our Right to Recover Payment, para. A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2,
app. B.
74 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15, § 3.10(a).
71 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(6) (McKinney 2003); see also KREINDLER ET AL.,
supra note 23.
76 See Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part F - General
Provisions, Our Right to Recover Payment, para. A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2,
app. B.
71 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 63. Subrogation has three basic purposes: first,
it prevents the insured from collecting twice for the same loss; second, subrogation




IV. REJECTION OF NEW YORK C.P.L.R. 1602(6)
This Note questions whether automobile accident cases
should be exempted from section 1601's limitations on joint and
several liability; it does not challenge joint and several liability
as a whole. The issue of joint and several liability has been
debated extensively and continues to divide leading tort
scholars."8 New York's joint and several liability scheme, as
enacted in section 1601, resolves the debate by compromise and
"partially" abolishes joint and several liability." Admittedly,
section 1602's exceptions to section 1601 undermine the extent
of the abolition,' but given the substantial disagreement
among contemporary tort scholars,8 section 1601's compromise
is not wholly unreasonable. 2 Proponents of joint and several
liability often argue that as between two negligent defendants
and an innocent plaintiff, the at-fault defendants should bear
the risk of a co-defendant's financial irresponsibility. Be that as
it may, this Note does not challenge the familiar argument.
Instead, this Note posits a different question, namely: what is
it about automobile accidents that justifies distinguishing
motorist-defendants from non-motorist-defendants in order to
deprive the former of section 1601's limitations on joint and
several liability?
In 1996, total liability costs in New York were twenty-
eight percent above the national average and totaled over
fourteen billion dollars.' From 1988 to 1996, the aggregate
number of tort filings in New York increased by fifty-eight
percent, "[running counter to the trend elsewhere in the
nation."' Most notably, despite a sharp drop in the number of
traffic accidents, huge increases in the value of motor vehicle-
related claims continue to drive up New Yorkers' automobile
insurance costs. 85
78 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A
Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125 (1989); see also Richard W.
Wright, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply to Professor Twerski, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1147 (1989); but see Aaron D. Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the
Bathwater: A Rejoinder to Professor Wright, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1161 (1989).
79 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
'0 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(1)-(12) (McKinney 2003).
8' See supra note 78.
82 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2003).
83 See Public Policy Institute, An Accident and a Dream, available at
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Joint and several liability's continued application to
automobile cases certainly drives up the cost of automobile
insurancem by forcing a financially responsible defendant's
automobile insurance carrier to bear the risk of an insolvent
joint tortfeasor. Even though insurance companies receive their
policyholders' right to contribution, there are many instances
in which that right will be worthless. 7 If a joint tortfeasor is
unidentifiable, insolvent, or uninsured, the insurance company
is left paying all of the plaintiffs damages when their
underlying policyholder may have been only minimally at fault.
Moreover, since approximately fourteen percent of U.S. drivers
are uninsured motorists' who typically have few assets to
satisfy a judgment, the risk of a financially irresponsible joint
tortfeasor is significant.9
It almost goes without saying that insurance companies,
as for-profit entities, must strive to maximize profit.' In order
to do so, they must shift the costs of unsatisfied contribution
claims to their policyholders by increasing automobile liability
insurance premiums. 91 Ultimately, all financially responsible
New York motorists bear the cost of increased claim payments
due to unsatisfied contribution claims. This Part argues that
financially responsible motorists need. not bear that increased
cost because the state's joint and several liability scheme is
both unjustified and, as a practical matter, unnecessary.
A. The Lack of Justification for Shifting the Risk of
Financial Irresponsibility in the Automobile Accident
Context
This subpart, by examining a claim for indemnity,
catalogues some of the other instances where the law shifts the
risk of financial irresponsibility to a defendant, and explores
the underlying policy concerns that justify doing so. This
survey reveals that the justifications that support risk shifting
See generally Cardi, supra note 7, at 1302.
87 Even if the joint tortfeasor is solvent and identifiable, the transaction costs
involved in pursuing a contribution claim will reduce the net recovery and, in certain
cases, discourage an insurer from pursuing contribution altogether. Id.
8' Compulsory Auto Insurance, supra note 54.
89 See generally BALDWIN, supra note 51, at 116.
90 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 527; see also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15,
at 12.
91 See OscAR G. CHASE & ROBERT A. BARKER, CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
38 (4th ed. 2002) (espousing the same principle, albeit in a different context).
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in those other instances simply do not exist in the automobile
accident context.
A claim for indemnity is one case where solid underlying
policy considerations justify shifting the risk of financial
irresponsibility. Claims for indemnity and contribution are
similar because in both cases a defendant seeks reimbursement
for damages he already has paid." There is, however, an
important substantive difference. 3 A claim for contribution
distributes losses among tortfeasors by requiring each to pay
his respective proportionate share to another tortfeasor who
has been held fully liable for their respective joint liability.' A
claim for indemnity, however, differs in that it "shift[s] the
entire cost of the judgment . . . from a [defendant] whose
liability to the plaintiff was not based on its own wrongful
conduct, but imposed on it by law because of its relationship
with the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the
injury."95 Thus, while a contribution claim ensures liability is
shared equitably amongst tortfeasors, an indemnity claim
shifts the entire liability from the defendant initially held liable
to the tortfeasor who actually caused the plaintiffs injuries.'
Since the defendant's initial liability to the injured party arises
because of someone else's wrongful conduct, the defendant can
later seek reimbursement from the actual wrongdoer. However,
even in the indemnity context, the original defendant still
bears the risk of financial irresponsibility because the
wrongdoer may be insolvent and unable to satisfy the
indemnity claim.
It is difficult to precisely state a rule as to when a claim
for indemnity will be allowed.97 However, indemnity claims are
92 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 341.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 387.
96 Id.
97 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 343. According to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability:
When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm and one of
them discharges the liability of another in whole or in part by settlement or
discharge of judgment, the person discharging the liability is entitled to
recover indemnity in the amount paid to the plaintiff, plus reasonable legal
expenses, if:
(1) the indemnitor has agreed by contract to indemnify the
indemnitee, or
(2) the indemnitee (i) was not liable except vicariously for the tort
of the indemnitor, or (ii) was not liable except as a seller of a
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commonly permitted when: an employer is held vicariously
liable for the tort of an employee;' the owner of an automobile
is held vicariously liable for the conduct of a driver;' or when a
retailer is held liable for a manufacturer's defect that injured a
consumer. "o
In the absence of a general rule, indemnification has
been permitted when the underlying policy motives demanded
that the risk of a financially irresponsible wrongdoer should
not be borne by the injured party.'"' In the employer-employee
context, it is fair to shift the risk of the employee's financial
irresponsibility to the employer because the employer can take
steps to safeguard itself from liability. For example, before
hiring an employee, an employer has the chance to screen and
evaluate the applicant. Accordingly, the employer can simply
not hire someone whom they believe may act in a risky
manner. Also, if an employee causes an injury, fairness
requires the employer to indemnify the injured party because
the employer was the agent that set forth the injury-causing
employee in motion. In any event, an employer can offset the
costs incurred from bearing the risk of an employee's financial
irresponsibility by increasing the price of the goods sold or
product supplied to the indemnitee by the indemnitor and the
indemnitee was not independently culpable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 22(a) (2000).
98 See generally 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation §
91 (2002). An employer held vicariously liable for the tort of an employee can thereafter
assert an indemnity claim against the employee-tortfeasor. See generally Rogers v.
Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 565 n.2, 300 N.E.2d 403, 410 n.2 (1973).
23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation § 91 (2002); see
also Traub v. Dinzler 309 N.Y. 395, 131 N.E.2d 564 (1955) (entitling the owner to
recover from the negligent driver where liability is predicated on the ownership of a
motor vehicle). Under N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2003), an owner of an
automobile is vicariously liable for the negligence of a permissive driver. Thus, an
automobile owner held vicariously liable under § 388, can assert an indemnity claim
against the permissive driver.
100 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation § 91 (2002); see,
e.g., Coleman v. Chesebro-Whitman Co., 678 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247, 177 Misc. 2d 566, 567
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (entitling retailer to indemnity against manufacturer of an
allegedly defective ladder). Indemnity is also allowed when "one is employed or directed
by another to do an act in his behalf, not manifestly wrong." Cohn v. Lionel Corp., 21
N.Y.2d 559, 563, 236 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1968). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note
13, at 343 (identifying the instances in which indemnity is allowed). A claim for
indemnity can also arise by agreement, commonly known as a "hold-harmless"
agreement. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 387.
'o' See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 593. Holding defendants vicariously
liable for the wrongful acts of another "represent[s] an obvious effort to find a
financially responsible defendant who can be charged with the liability of another who,
in general, cannot be relied on to pay a judgment." Id.
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services rendered.'°2 Thus, fairness requires the employer to
bear the risk that his employees may be financially
irresponsible.
Similarly, in the automobile owner-permissive driver
context, shifting the risk of a permissive driver's financial
irresponsibility to the automobile's owner is also justified. As in
the employer-employee context, the automobile owner also has
an opportunity to screen and evaluate the potential driver
before incurring any liability. Again, since the automobile
owner can refuse permission and insulate himself from the
risk, policy concerns support shifting the risk of a permissive
driver's financial irresponsibility to the automobile owner.
Likewise, when a defective product injures a consumer,
policy rationales support shifting the risk of the manufacturer's
financial irresponsibility to the retailer. Before selling the
'manufacturer's defective product, the retailer has an
opportunity to screen and evaluate the manufacturers they
purchased from. If a particular manufacturer appears
financially unstable or on the brink of insolvency, the retailer
can either refuse to purchase from the manufacturer altogether
or purchase the goods at a discount to offset the risk incurred.
Furthermore, the costs of incurring such a risk can, as in the
employer-employee context, be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices.'"
As the prior examples illustrate, the risk of a financially
irresponsible wrongdoer will be shifted only when policy
motives demand that such a risk should not be borne by the
injured party." In each of the aforementioned cases, the risk of
financial irresponsibility shifts when the indemnitee either has
an opportunity to screen and evaluate the indemnitor, or when
the indemnitee has a readily available mechanism to pass on
the costs of the risk to a third party. In either case, the risk of a
financially irresponsible wrongdoer is transferred only when
the underlying policy motives justify doing so.
102 Such a price increase would not harm a firm's relative competitive position
because all firms within a given industry should incur similar costs. Firms will
commonly purchase similarly priced liability insurance to re-transfer this risk to an
insurer. See Insurance Service Office, 1996 Commercial General Liability Policy,
Coverage A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2, at 246-47; see also generally REJDA,
supra note 2, at 243-47 (reviewing an employers major general liability loss exposures
and the corresponding coverages provided by the commercial general liability policy).
103 See supra note 102
104 KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 593.
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In the automobile accident context, the policy rationales
for shifting the risk of a financially irresponsible co-defendant
are much weaker. Under section 1602(6), if car A and car B
(uninsured and insolvent) collide and injure a pedestrian, the
risk of B's financial irresponsibility transfers to A. But, unlike
the examples above, A neither has an opportunity to select and
evaluate with whom he would collide, nor has a mechanism
through which the costs of the risk could be passed on or
transferred to a third party. Therefore, policy concerns do not
seem to justify shifting the risk of financial irresponsibility.
One might argue that the cost of the risk easily
transfers to A's insurance carrier, which then spreads it and
passes it on to other consumers. However, A himself still
ultimately bears the cost, merely disguised in the form of
higher premiums."°5 Crucially, in addition to those costs, if the
plaintiffs damages exceed A's liability insurance limits, A could
be forced to personally fund a portion of the judgment.10 Thus,
financially responsible motorists like A cannot fully pass on the
increased premiums and must ultimately bear at least some of
the costs themselves. Since automobile liability insurance is
mandatory in New York, ' motorists confront a Hobson's
choice:"u either pay the increased automobile liability insurance
premiums or stop driving altogether, an unacceptable
alternative for rural and suburban motorists without access to
public transportation.
Nonetheless, despite its costs, section 1602(6) does
provide a policy benefit."u Section 1602(6) attempts to
105 See generally supra text accompanying notes 90-9 1.
106 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(6) (McKinney 2003).
107 See New York State Department of Insurance, supra note 55.
108 A "Hobson's choice" is a choice that offers no real alternative. AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 646 (3d ed. 1997). The term derives from Thomas
Hobson, an "English keeper of a livery stable, from his requirement that customers
take the horse nearest the stable door or none." Id.
109 In Governor Mario Cuomo's approval memorandum of the bill containing
C.P.L.R. 1602(6) he noted that:
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indemnify automobile accident victims for their injuries by
holding any single defendant fully liable."' However, as more
fully explained in the following subsections, that benefit is
greatly reduced in light of the existing protections provided by
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage for PAP-insured
plaintiffs,"' and by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity
Corporation (MVAIC) for non-PAP-insured plaintiffs."'
Moreover, repealing section 1602(6) would not
necessarily eliminate joint and several liability in all
automobile accident cases. Alternatively, plaintiffs may be able
to rely upon section 1602(7), which provides that the
limitations on joint and several liability in section 1601 do "not
apply to any person held liable for causing claimant's injury by
having acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others."1"'
Therefore, even if section 1602(6) is repealed, joint and several
liability could still be applied in cases where a plaintiff is
injured by a "reckless" motorist."4 While the aforementioned
economic arguments against joint and several liability apply
equally to a "reckless" driver, as a matter of fairness, the
increase in culpability arguably overrides those otherwise
persuasive policy arguments, justifying the shift in cost. In any
case, despite repealing section 1602(6), joint and several
liability could still be applied in some of the most deserving
automobile accident cases.
The bill also contains a number of exceptions [i.e. section 1602(6)] to this
modification of the rule of joint and several liability, including instances in
which the defendant acts in reckless disregard for the safety of others or
instances in which the defendant's acts upon which liability is based are
willfully performed or intentionally performed in concert with others ....
The crafting of these exceptions and savings provisions reflects careful
deliberations over the appropriate situations for a modified joint and several
liability rule and demonstrates the benefits of addressing this important
reform through the legislative process.
Mario Cuomo, Governor's Approval Memorandum Regarding Toxic Torts/Discovery
Statute of Limitations, in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL-1986, at 288-89
(Pamela Sibener ed., 1986).
New York State Senator Ronald B. Stafford also commented on the bill. In
a memorandum outlining the purposes of the bill, he noted that "the doctrine of joint
and several liability as it applies to non-economic damages in certain personal injury
actions would be modified to provide a more just apportionment of risk and
entitlement." Ronald B. Stafford, Memorandum of Senator Ronald B. Stafford
Regarding Toxic Torts/Discovery Statute of Limitations, in NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL-1986, at 288 (Pamela Sibener ed., 1986).
"o See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(6) (McKinney 2003).
. See generally infra text accompanying note 116-31.
12 See generally infra text accompanying note 132-48.
"' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(7) (McKinney 2003).
114 Id.
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In sum, the reasons that normally support risk shifting
do not exist in the cases of negligent automobile accidents
because joint tortfeasors cannot control the conduct of other
drivers, and because they cannot fully transfer the cost of that
risk. Moreover, the substantially similar protections afforded
injured plaintiffs by mandatory uninsured motorist coverage
and the MVAIC greatly diminish the benefit that the current
liability scheme provides.' 5 Since the policy benefits of section
1602(6) do not outweigh its costs, section 1602(6) is unjustified
and should be repealed.
B. The Redundancy of Section 1602(6)'s Protections
1. Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Coverage Already
Protects PAP-Insured Plaintiffs from Financially
Irresponsible Defendants
Plaintiffs injured by automobiles divide into two broad
classes: PAP-insured plaintiffs or non-PAP-insured plaintiffs.
Neither class of plaintiffs needs section 1602(6)'s protection
from financially irresponsible defendants because they already
are protected. PAP-insured plaintiffs are protected from
financially irresponsible defendants, irrespective of section
1602(6), by the uninsured motorist coverage provided by their
PAP, while non-PAP-insured plaintiffs are protected by the
MVAIC."
7
Uninsured motorist coverage is a fault-based, first-party
coverage that pays an insured' for bodily injury caused by an
uninsured motorist or hit-and-run driver."' An insured receives
uninsured motorist benefits only if the uninsured motorist is
found legally liable for the insured's injury.'20 The PAP provides
that the insurer "will pay compensatory damages which an
115 See generally supra text accompanying note 59 and infra text
accompanying notes 116-48.
116 See generally Insurance Service Office 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part C -
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2, app. B.
117 See generally infra text accompanying notes 132-48.
"" An "insured" under the Uninsured Motorist coverage is broadly defined to
include the named policyholder, relatives, and any other passenger occupying the
insured automobile. See generally Insurance Service Office 1994 Personal Auto Policy,
Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2, app. B.
119 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 176. Uninsured motorist coverage was
developed in response to increasing pressure in 1955 for adoption of compulsory
liability insurance in New York. KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 15, at 399 n.3.
120 See REJDA, supra note 2, at 176.
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insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator
of an 'uninsured motor vehicle' because of bodily injury."12' Most
states mandate uninsured motorist coverage, '22 and in New
York all motorists must carry at least fifty thousand dollars of
coverage."' Thus, the compulsory uninsured motorist coverage
protects PAP-insured plaintiffs from financially irresponsible
defendants, irrespective of section 1602(6). The uninsured
motorist coverage transfers the risk of a financially
irresponsible defendant from the plaintiff to his or her insurer.
Since PAP-insured plaintiffs are protected by their uninsured
motorist coverage, the protection of section 1602(6) is
unnecessary.
Although the plaintiffs insurer will initially fund an
uninsured defendant's damages, the plaintiffs insurer can
recover its payments from any other defendant jointly or
severally liable with the uninsured defendant.12 ' As a result,
under section 1602(6), a responsible defendant's insurer
ultimately bears the risk of a financially irresponsible joint-
tortfeasor."2 ' A defendant's insurer can seek contribution from
the other tortfeasors for the liability claim paid in excess of
their underlying policyholder's apportioned fault, but such
claims are difficult to satisfy. This increased exposure drives up
claim payments, which naturally leads to higher automobile
liability insurance premiums."' Since automobile liability
insurance is compulsory, financially responsible motorists
ultimately must fund the unpaid claims of financially
irresponsible motorists.
Eliminating section 1602(6) could limit a defendant's
liability for the plaintiffs non-economic damages to his
apportioned percentage of fault, and thereby reduce automobile
liability rates. 7 Plaintiffs would lose the benefit of joint and
"' Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part C - Uninsured
Motorists Coverage, Insurance Agreement A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note 2, app. B.
122 See PAUL W. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 2002-03, app. A (1972).
123 See Compulsory Auto Insurance, supra note 54; see also N.Y. INS. LAW §
3420(f)(1) (McKinney 2003).
124 PRETZEL, supra note 122, at 45 ("For example, when an insured car and an
uninsured car collide in circumstances where both would be liable for resulting injury
to persons in a third car, the insurer of the third car has been held to have the right to
reduce its uninsured motorist coverage payments by the amount paid by the liability
insurance company covering the insured vehicle.").
125 See id.
126 See KEETON ETAL., supra note 13, at 591.
"' See id. (explaining that an increase in plaintiff's recoveries also increases
liability insurance rates).
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several liability and would have to bear some risk that a joint
tortfeasor is insolvent or unidentifiable. However, plaintiffs
already benefit from the mandatory minimum uninsured
motorist coverage, and can purchase additional supplemental
uninsured motorist (SUM) coverage."8 In fact, insurers are
required to offer SUM limits of $250,000 per person per
accident and $500,000 per accident if a person has bodily injury
liability limits of that amount or higher.2" The decrease in
liability insurance rates realized by eliminating section 1602(6)
can then be used by policyholders to purchase additional SUM
coverage if they feel the mandatory fifty thousand dollar limit
is inadequate.'30 A policyholder electing to increase the
uninsured motorist coverage can double the coverage to one
hundred thousand dollars for only approximately forty dollars
per year. 3' In either case, eliminating section 1602(6) would
lower automobile liability insurance rates and give motorists
the freedom to decide for themselves how to manage the risk of
a financially irresponsible defendant. Thus, section 1602(6) is
redundant and unnecessary because uninsured motorist
coverage can provide PAP-insured plaintiffs with substantially
similar protection in a more equitable fashion.
2. The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation Already Protects Non-PAP-Insured
Plaintiffs from Financially Irresponsible Defendants
Although compulsory uninsured motorist coverage can
provide PAP-insured plaintiffs the same protections as section
1602(6), uninsured motorist coverage only protects an "insured"
as defined in the PAP.32 An "insured" under the uninsured
motorist coverage section of the PAP includes the policyholder,
128 See New York State Department of Insurance, supra note 55.
129 See id. "Increasing the [uninsured coverage] reimbursement to
$300,000/$500,000 will cause an insignificant increase in premium relative to the
increased protection provided." BALDWIN, supra note 51, at 111.
130 Given the competitive nature of the insurance industry and generally
accepted neo-classical economic principles, it is reasonable to assume that the
reduction in claim payments realized by abolishing section 1602(6) will result in lower
liability premiums.
131 See "How Much Policy Do You Need?" Uninsured or Underinsured
Motorist, at http://www.smartmoney.com/insurance/auto/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
132 See Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part C -
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring Agreement A, reprinted in REJDA, supra note




any family member, and anyone else occupying the vehicle. '33
The coverage also protects the policyholder and her family
members from uninsured defendants for injuries sustained as
pedestrians." Although "insured" is defined broadly, the term
is not all encompassing. Individuals who are not PAP
policyholders, family members of PAP policyholders, or
passengers in a covered automobile, are not within the
definition- and lack coverage.
For example, assume motorists A and B negligently
collide into each other and skid onto the sidewalk injuring a
pedestrian (P). P, under section 1602(6), can elect to sue either
A, B, or A and B because both drivers are jointly and severally
liable. Assuming B is insolvent and uninsured, P will elect to
sue A. P will be able to recover all of her damages from A,
despite the fact that A may only be partly responsible. If
section 1602(6) is repealed, as this Note suggests, A would be
liable to P for all of P's economic losses, but A's liability for P's
non-economic losses would be limited to A's apportioned
percentage of culpability.' The remaining non-economic losses
apportioned to B would be left unsatisfied. The previous section
explained that if P has a PAP or is a family member of a PAP
policyholder, she would then be protected by her own
compulsory uninsured motorist coverage for the remaining
unpaid damages. However, if P is not an insured, the
uninsured motorist coverage will not protect her from the
financially irresponsible co-defendant."a
However, the MVAIC protects non-PAP-insured
plaintiffs, like P, from financially irresponsible defendants.'37
"The MVAIC is a non-profit corporation consisting of all
insurers authorized in New York State that write motor vehicle
133 See Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part C -
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring Agreement B, reprinted in REJDA, supra note
2, app. B.
131 See generally BALDWIN, supra note 51, at 111.
135 This assumes A is apportioned no more than 50% of the fault. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2003).
136 See Insurance Service Office, 1994 Personal Auto Policy, Part C -
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring Agreement B, reprinted in REJDA, supra note
2, app. B (defining "insured" as including the named insured, family members, and
anyone else occupying the automobile).
,.. See Michael Pilarz, Uninsured Motorists Coverage, available at
http://www.pilarz.com/motorists-coverage.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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liability insurance. ' 38 "Every insurer authorized to write motor
vehicle liability insurance in the State of New York, as a
condition precedent thereto, is required to be a member of the
[IVAICI."'3' The MVAIC provides compensation for injury or
death to "qualified persons" who are involved in accidents
caused by an uninsured motorist within New York State.°
14
"Qualified persons" eligible to receive benefits from the
MVAIC are defined in Insurance Law section 5202(b) as New
York residents who are not the following: an insured under an
automobile policy; the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle; or
the uninsured motor vehicle owner's spouse while a passenger
in the uninsured vehicle.' Thus, if an uninsured motorist
injures a "qualified person," that person can recover her
damages from the MVAIC.' 42 The MVAIC provides qualified
persons with benefits for basic economic losses,'4 ' and non-
"8 VERONICA DUNCAN-BLACK, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF THE MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1999 (June
18, 2001), at httpJ/www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/mvaic99.pdf.
139 Id. at 4.
14o See id. The MVAIC provides compensation for injuries caused by:
uninsured motor vehicles; unidentified motor vehicles which leave the scene of the
accident; stolen motor vehicles; motor vehicles operated without the permission of the
owner; insured motor vehicles where the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage;
and unregistered motor vehicles. See id.
141 See Pilarz, supra note 137.
142 See id. The protection provided by the MVAIC is not absolute. "Insurance
Law 5210(a)(1) . . .provides that the maximum judgment payable by the MVAIC 'on
account of injury to one person in any one accident' -caused by a 'financially
irresponsible motorist,' shall not exceed $10,000." Norman H. Dachs & Jonathan A.
Dachs, How UM and UIM Are Linked With other Areas of Law, N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1993,
at 3. See, e.g., Massey v. City of New York, 589 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 Misc. 580, 582 (Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1992) (rewarding plaintiff injured by an automobile ten thousand dollars
from the MVAIC).
Although the damages payable by the MVAIC are limited to $10,000, there
will not be many cases in which the plaintiff will have to rely on the MVAIC because
the uninsured motorist coverage protects all PAP policy holders and their family
members. In the unlikely event that the plaintiff is not an "insured" under the PAP,
the only case in which a plaintiff who suffers a serious injury will be left with
unsatisfied damages is if the financially irresponsible defendant's apportioned
percentage of non-economic damages exceeds $10,000. In such a case, the plaintiff will
be able to recover all of her economic damages from the insured defendant (assuming
the defendant was found more than 50% at fault and the plaintiff suffered a "serious
injury"), but with respect to non-economic damages the plaintiff will only collect the
amount that is apportioned to the insured defendant. The remaining non-economic
damages apportioned to the financially irresponsible defendant will be paid by the
MVAIC, subject to the $10,000 limit, if the plaintiff suffers a serious injury. Thus,
although the MVAIC's protection is not absolute, it is substantial.
143 "Basic economic loss" is defined in NY Insurance Law section 5102(a) as:
[aill necessary expenses incurred for: (i) medical, hospital, . . . surgical,
nursing, dental, ambulance, x-ray, prescription drug and prosthetic services;
(ii) psychiatric, physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation ... and
20041
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economic losses if the qualified person suffers a serious
injury.'"
Consequently, both the MVAIC and section 1602(6)
operate to protect non-PAP-insured plaintiffs, albeit to
different degrees, from financially irresponsible defendants. "5
However, the MVAIC provides the protection in a more cost-
effective and equitable manner. Unlike section 1602(6), which
can subject individual defendants to unlimited liability,
exceeding their apportioned degree of fault, the MVAIC limits
its payments to ten thousand dollars and allocates the costs of
its payments proportionally, across the entire New York
automobile insurance market."6
At bottom, the legislature is faced with the difficult task
of dealing with the risk of financially irresponsible motorists in
a manner that will accommodate the competing policy concerns
of battling the rising cost of automobile insurance and ensuring
plaintiff indemnification. While abolishing section 1602(6)
would decrease insurance premiums to the detriment of
plaintiff indemnification, the MVAIC would step in to
ameliorate the effect. After abolishing section 1602(6), the
MVAIC's payments, as a whole, would increase, in turn
increasing each insurer's mandatory MVAIC contribution.
Those increases would tend to result in premium increases, but
(iv) any other professional health services . . . [as well as] loss of earnings
from work which the person would have performed had he not been injured.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(a) (McKinney 2003).
144 See Pilarz, supra note 137. "Serious injury" is defined in NY Insurance Law
section 5102(d) as:
a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant
disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body
organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of
use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function
or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-
permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing
substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual
and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one
hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or
impairment.
N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102(d) (McKinney 2003).
145 Thus, if C.P.L.R. section 1602(6) is repealed, P, the pedestrian in the prior
example, would be entitled to recover for the injuries caused by B (the uninsured
defendant) from the MVAIC. In order for a qualified person to recover from the MVAIC
they must file an affidavit within 180 days from the accident stating, inter alia: (i) that
the person has a cause of action for damages arising out of an accident; (ii) the facts in
support of the claim; and (iii) that the claim lies against either the owner or operator of
a designated uninsured motor vehicle; against a person whose identity is
unascertainable, such as a hit-and-run driver; or against a person whose insurer has
disclaimed liability. See Pilarz, supra note 137, pt. B.2.
146 See Duncan-Black, supra note 138.
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for two reasons would be offset by even greater savings realized
by abolishing 1602(6). First and foremost, each claim would be
limited to ten thousand dollars."' Second, under the law of
large numbers, pooling claims generated by financially
irresponsible motorists would decrease the influence of
actuarial abnormalities on the total amount of claims."8 In sum,
abolishing 1602(6) and shifting the claims of non-PAP-insured
plaintiffs generated by financially irresponsible drivers to the
MVAIC would strike a fair balance between two otherwise
competing policy concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
New York automobile liability insurance rates have
risen to unacceptable levels and section 1602(6)'s preservation
of joint and several liability continues to fuel the rate hikes.'9
"New Yorkers overwhelmingly believe that the cost of lawsuit
awards is too high, and that the current liability system needs
major reform.""' Repealing section 1602(6) would be a good
start. It lacks the solid policy rationale that normally justifies
shifting the risk of financial irresponsibility from the plaintiff
to the defendant. Moreover, uninsured motorist coverage and
the MVAIC provide substantially similar protection in a more
equitable fashion, making the provision redundant and costly.
Repealing section 1602(6) would limit a defendant's liability to
his apportioned degree of fault and lower New York's costly
automobile insurance rates. Commentators have referred to
section 1602(6) as having "little rhyme or reason""' and
"lack[ing] intellectual rigor.""'2 It has also been characterized as
"enigmatic""' and "truly the product of political give-and-
147 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5210(a)(1) (McKinney 2003).
14" BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 316 (5th ed.
1988). The law of large numbers is a "statistical concept that holds the greater the
number of units in a projection, the less important each unit becomes. Group
insurance, which gets cheaper as the group gets larger, is an example of the principle."
Id. See also Cardi, supra note 7 at 1302 (recognizing that actuarial abnormalities that
interfere with risk assessment tend to drive up insurance premiums).
149 See Erny v. Russo, 754 A.2d 606, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(recognizing that "[tihe enhanced liability exposure by New York's joint and several
liability law is a factor in the calculation of automobile insurance rates in that state").
"0 New Yorkers for Civil Justice Reform, Public Opinion: Zogby Poll Finds
Support for Reform, at http://www.nycjr.org/opinion.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
5' Mutter, supra note 48, at 318.
152 id.
" Cardi, supra note 7, at 1304 n.61.
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take." " Therefore, it is not surprising that there is only one
other state besides New York that recognizes such a needless
exception.'55
Joseph D. Zavaglia'
Mutter, supra note 48, at 318.
' See id.; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (2003).
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